Abstract. This paper deals with the analysis of critical observability and design of observers for networks of Finite State Machines (FSMs). Critical observability is a property of FSMs that corresponds to the possibility of detecting immediately if the current state of an FSM reaches a set of critical states modeling unsafe operations. This property is relevant in safety-critical applications where the timely recovery of human errors and device failures is of primary importance in ensuring safety. A critical observer is an observer that detects on-line the occurrence of critical states. When a large-scale network of FSMs is considered, the construction of such an observer is prohibitive because of the large computational effort needed. In this paper we propose a decentralized architecture for critical observers of networks of FSMs, where on-line detection of critical states is performed by local critical observers, each associated with an FSM of the network. For the design of local observers, efficient algorithms were provided which are based on on-the-fly techniques. Further, we present results on model reduction of networks of FSMs, based on bisimulation equivalence preserving critical observability. The advantages of the proposed approach in terms of computational complexity are discussed and examples offered.
Introduction
In recent years, Cyber-Physical Systems have been intensively investigated by both academic and industrial communities because they offer a solid paradigm for modeling, analysis and control of many next generation large-scale, complex, distributed and networked engineered systems. Among them, safety-critical applications, as for example Air Traffic Management systems, play a prominent role. Ensuring safety in large-scale and networked safety-critical applications is a tough but challenging problem. In particular, complexity is one of the most difficult issues that must be overcome to make theoretical methodologies applicable to real industrial applications. In this paper we address the analysis of critical observability and design of observers for networks of Finite State Machines (FSMs). A network of FSMs is a collection of FSMs whose interaction is captured by the notion of parallel composition. Critical observability is a property that corresponds to the possibility of detecting immediately if the current state of an FSM reaches a set of critical states, modeling unsafe operations. This notion has been introduced in [5] for linear switching systems and is relevant in safety-critical applications where the timely recovery of human errors and device failures is of primary importance in ensuring safety. Current approaches available in the literature to check critical observability are based on regular language theory as in [6] or on the design of the so-called critical observers [2, 5] . The computational complexity of the first approach is polynomial in the number of states of the FSM, while the one of the second is exponential. Although disadvantageous from the computational complexity point of view, the construction of critical observers cannot be avoided at the implementation layer since it is necessary for the automatic on-line detection of critical situations. Motivated by this issue we elaborated on some results which can reduce, in some cases drastically, the computational effort in designing critical observers for large-scale networks of FSMs. We first propose a decentralized architecture for critical observers of the network, which is composed of a collection of local critical observers, each associated with an FSM of the network. Efficient algorithms for the synthesis of critical observers are proposed, based on on-the-fly techniques for verification and control of FSMs (see e.g. [4, 16] ). We then propose some results on model reduction based on bisimulation equivalence [8, 10] , which plays a fundamental role for mitigating complexity in formal verification. We reduce the original network of FSMs to a smaller one, obtained as the quotient of the original network induced by the bisimulation equivalence. In the reduction process, FSMs composing the network are never composed, a key factor in complexity reduction. We first show that critical observability of the original network implies and is implied by the critical observability of the quotient network. We then show that a decentralized critical observer for the original network can be easily derived from the one designed for the quotient network. The advantages of the proposed approach in terms of computational complexity are discussed and illustrated through examples. Critical observability is closely related to fault diagnosability (see e.g. [18] and the references therein). While critical observability requires the immediate detection of a critical state, diagnosability allows for a finite delay before fault detection; moreover, while critical states are needed to be detected whenever they are reached, faults are detected only the first time they are reached. Decentralized diagnosability for networks of FSMs has been extensively studied in the literature and several approaches have been proposed to tackle complexity, see e.g. [1, 3, 13, 14, 15] . To the best of authors' knowledge, on-the-fly techniques proposed in this paper were not explored before in the literature on (decentralized) diagnosability. Model reduction via bisimulation for monolithic FSMs has been proposed in [17] , as a tool to facilitate the fault diagnosability property check. While [17] performs bisimulation-based reduction on a monolithic FSM, our approach proposes a reduction of the network of FSMs that are never composed, thereby allowing model reduction at a higher level of abstraction, and therefore being more effective. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces notation, networks of FSMs and the critical observability property. Section 3 presents the main results of the paper concerning decentralized critical observers and model reduction. Illustrative examples are reported in Section 4. Section 5 offers concluding remarks and outlook. We include in the Appendix the proofs of some technical results.
Networks of Finite State Machines and critical observability
In this section, we start by introducing our notation in Subsection 2.1. We then recall the notions of networks of finite states machines in Subsection 2.2 and critical observability in Subsection 2.3.
2.1. Notation and preliminary definitions. The symbols ∧ and ∨ denote the And and Or logical operators, respectively. The symbol N denotes the set of nonnegative integers. Given n, m ∈ N with n < m let be [n; m] = [n, m] ∩ N. The symbol |X| denotes the cardinality of a finite set X. The symbol 2 X denotes the power set of a set X. Given a function f : X → Y we denote by f (Z) the image of a set Z ⊆ X through f , i.e. f (Z) = {y ∈ Y |∃z ∈ Z s.t. y = f (z)}; if X ⊂ X and Y ⊂ Y then f | X →Y is the restriction of f to domain X and co-domain Y , i.e. f | X →Y (x) = f (x) for any x ∈ X with f (x) ∈ Y . We now recall from [2] some basic notions of language theory. Given a set Σ, a sequence w = σ 1 σ 2 σ 3 ... with symbols σ i ∈ Σ is called a word in Σ; the empty word is denoted by ε. The Kleene closure w * of a finite word w is the collection of finite words ε, w, ww, www, ... . The symbol Σ * denotes the set of all finite words in Σ, including the empty word ε. The concatenation of two words u, v ∈ Σ * is denoted by uv ∈ Σ * . Any subset of Σ * is called a language. The projection of a language L ⊆ Σ * onto a subset Σ of Σ is the language
where P Σ (w) is inductively defined for any w ∈ L and σ ∈ Σ by P Σ (ε) = ε and P Σ (wσ) = P Σ (w)σ if σ ∈ Σ and P Σ (wσ) = P Σ (w), otherwise.
Networks of Finite State Machines.
We start by recalling the notion of finite state machines.
where X is the set of states, X 0 ⊆ X is the set of initial states, Σ is the set of input labels and δ : X × Σ → 2 X is the transition map.
A state run r of an FSM M is a sequence
for any x i and σ i in the sequence; the sequence σ 1 σ 2 σ 3 ... is called the trace associated with r. For X ⊆ X and σ ∈ Σ, we abuse notation by writing δ(X , σ) instead of x∈X δ(x, σ). The extended transition mapδ associated with δ is inductively defined for any w ∈ Σ * , σ ∈ Σ and x ∈ X by δ(x, ε) = {x} andδ(x, wσ) = y∈δ(x,w) δ(y, σ). The language generated by M , denoted L(M ), is composed by all traces generated by M , or equivalently,
The class of FSMs in Definition 2.1 is non-deterministic. An FSM M is deterministic if |X 0 | = 1 and |δ(x, σ)| ≤ 1, for any x ∈ X and σ ∈ Σ. In this paper we are interested in studying whether it is possible to detect if the current state of an FSM M is or is not in a set of critical states C ⊂ X representing unsafe operations. We refer to an FSM (X, X 0 , Σ, δ) equipped with a set of critical states C by the tuple (X, X 0 , Σ, δ, C). We also refer to an FSM with outputs by a tuple (X, X 0 , Σ, δ, Y, H), where Y is the set of output labels and H : X → Y is the output function. For simplicity we call an FSM equipped with critical states or with outputs as an FSM. The operator Ac(·) extracts the accessible part from an FSM M = (X,
Interaction among FSMs is captured by the following notion of composition.
The parallel composition operation is commutative up to isomorphisms and associative.
The proof of the above result is reported in the Appendix. By the above property of parallel composition, we may write in the sequel 3 and C (1,2), 3 . In this paper we consider a network 
2.3. Critical observability and observers. Critical observability corresponds to the possibility of detecting immediately whether the current state x of a run of an FSM is or is not critical on the basis of the information given by the corresponding trace at state x:
, for any initial state x 0 ∈ X 0 and any trace w ∈ L(M ).
Any FSM M having an initial state that is critical and another initial state that is not critical, is never critically observable. For this reason in the sequel we assume that [
An illustrative example follows. Fig. 1 , where
and transition maps δ 1 and δ 2 are represented by labeled arrows in Fig. 1 ; labels on the arrows represent the input label associated with the corresponding transition. FSM M 1 is not critically observable because it is possible to reach both noncritical state 3 and critical state 4 starting from the initial state 1, by applying the same input label a. FSM M 2 is critically observable because by applying traces b(ab)
* and b(ab) * a to the initial state 5, the state reached is always in X 2 \C 2 while by applying any trace other than the previous ones, states reached are always critical.
On-line detection of critical states of critically observable FSMs can be obtained by means of critical observers, as defined hereafter. 
For later use, we report from e.g. [2] the following construction of observers. 
Main results
In this section, we first show that critical observability of all the FSMs composing a network ensures the critical observability of their parallel composition, i.e. of the network itself. However, a network of FSMs can be critically observable even though not all the FSMs composing the network are critically observable. This means that for checking the critical observability of a network we need to compose the FSMs, and this may be problematic especially when dealing with large-scale networks where a large number of FSMs has to be composed. We therefore propose two complementary approaches to tackle this problem. First, in Subsection 3.1 we propose a decentralized architecture for critical observers detecting on-line occurrence of critical states. Then, in Subsection 3.2 we propose the use of bisimulation equivalence for reducing the complexity of the composition. Finally, in Subsection 3.3 we combine these two approaches. * ab) * and b(cd) * a(b(cd) * a) * to the initial state (1, 5) , the state reached is always in X 1,2 \C 1,2 and by applying any trace other than the previous ones, states reached are always in C 1,2 .
As a consequence, critical observability of each FSM composing N is not necessary for M(N ) to be critically observable.
3.1. Design of decentralized critical observers. In this section, we show how decentralized observers can be used for detecting critical states of the network of FSMs M(N ). The notion of isomorphism will be used:
Given N , consider the collection of deterministic FSMs Proof. We start by showing the result for the network
Let be Obs
. Moreover, with reference to Definition 3.3, we get: Condition (i). By Definitions 2.2 and 2.7 we get φ(X
Obs .
Conditions (ii) and (iii). We proceed by induction and show that if
With reference to Definition 2.2, we have three cases: (case 1) σ ∈ Σ 1 ∩ Σ 2 , (case 2) σ ∈ Σ 1 \Σ 2 , and (case 3) σ ∈ Σ 2 \Σ 1 . We start with case 1. By Definitions 2.2 and 2.7 we get δ Obs (φ((
. Cases 2 and 3 can be shown by using similar arguments.
The last conditions imply that z 1 × z 2 ∩ C 1,2 = ∅ which, by Definition 2.7, implies H Obs (z 1 × z 2 ) = 0. Hence, the isomorphic equivalence in (3.2) is proven. We now generalize (3.2) to the case of a generic network N = {M 1 , M 2 , ..., M N }. By applying recursively the equivalence in (3.2 ) and by Proposition 3.4, we get Obs(M(N )) = Obs(
In the sequel, we will refer to the FSM Obs d (N ) satisfying condition (iii) of Proposition 2.8 as a decentralized critical observer for N . An example of application of the above result follows. In order to cope with the aforementioned drawbacks, we now present a procedure that integrates each step of Algorithm 1 in one algorithm. This procedure is based on on-the-fly algorithms for verification and control of FSMs (see e.g. [4, 16] ) and is reported in Algorithm 2. 
16
:
18:
X Obs,i := X Obs,i ∪ {z
19:
δ Obs,i (zi, σ) := {z Moreover it is also clear that in the worst case, the computational complexity of Algorithm 2 is the same as the one in Algorithm 1, i.e. O(2 nmaxN ). This is typical for on-the-fly based algorithms. However, there are practical cases in which Algorithm 2 performs better than Algorithm 1; an example is included in Section 4.
3.2.
Model reduction via bisimulation. In this section we propose the use of bisimulation equivalence [8, 10] to reduce the computational complexity in checking critical observability and designing observers. We start by recalling the notion of bisimulation equivalence. (iii) for any σ ∈ Σ 2 such that δ 2 (x 2 , σ) = ∅ and for any x
The above notion of bisimulation equivalence differs from the classical one [8, 10] because of the additional condition (iv). By adding this condition, we get the following result: 2 ) log(n 1 + n 2 )), respectively, see e.g. [9, 7] . Bisimulation equivalence is an equivalence relation on the class of FSMs. We now define the network of FSMs N min as the quotient of the original network N induced by the bisimulation equivalence. More precisely given N , define the following equivalence classes induced by the bisimulation equivalence:
such that the collection of FSMs M i(k,j) coincides with N and
∈ E k a representative of the equivalence class E k and define the network of FSMs
. The forthcoming results rely upon the following technical lemmas whose proofs are included in the Appendix. ; 3] and suppose that M 2 and M 3 are bisimilar. Then an FSM Obs is a critical observer for M 1 ||M 2 if and only if it is a critical observer for We now have all the ingredients to present the main results of this section. 
Lemma 3.10. Consider FSMs
. Hence, by applying recursively Lemma 3.10 to all other FSMs M ∈ N \N min and by making use of Proposition 2.3 to properly rearrange terms in the composed FSM, the result follows.
The above results reduce the computational complexity effort since they show that it is possible to consider the reduced network N min to check critical observability and to design critical observers for the original network N . We stress that the model reduction via bisimulation equivalence that we propose here is performed on the collection of FSMs M i and not on the monolithic FSM M(N ), as done for example in [17] ; this may allow a drastic computational complexity reduction when several bisimilar FSMs are present in the network. 
As a consequence of Proposition 3.9 (ii), the composition of local observers computed in line 8 of Algorithm 3 is a decentralized critical observer for N . We conclude this section with a computational complexity analysis. We focus on computational complexity with respect to parameters n max , N and N min . A traditional approach to check critical observability of the network N = {M 1 , M 2 , ..., M N } consists in computing Obs(M(N )), whose space and time computational complexity by Corollary 3.6 is O(2 nmaxN ), as reported in the second column of Table 1 . Computational complexity analysis of Algorithm 3 follows. In line 1, one needs to check bisimulation equivalence between any pair of FSMs M i , M j in N whose space computational complexity is O(n Complexity Table 1 . Computational complexity analysis.
Illustrative examples
In this section we illustrate the results of the previous sections through two academic examples. In both examples, the goal is to check if a network N is critically observable and if so, to design a decentralized critical observer for N . For this purpose we apply Algorithm 3. In the sequel, space complexity of an FSM is computed as S 1 + S 2 where S 1 is the sum of the data needed to be stored for each transition and S 2 is the number of output data associated with states. Date stored for a transition from a state (z 1 , z 2 , ..., z m ) to a state (z (2, 10) , (3, 11) , (3, 12) , (4, 13)} and that FSMs M 2 and M 4 are bisimilar with bisimulation relation R 24 = {(5, 14), (6, 15) , (7, 16) , (7, 17) , (7, 18) , (8, 16) , (8, 17) , (8, 18) 
Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed decentralized critical observers for networks of FSMs. On-line detection of critical states is performed by local critical observers, each one associated with an FSM of the network. For the design of local observers, efficient algorithms were provided which are based on on-the-fly techniques. Model reduction of networks of FSMs via bisimulation equivalence was shown to facilitate the design of distributed observers for the original network. In some specific applications, as e.g. in Air Traffic Management systems, critical states may be associated to aggregates of FSMs rather than single FSMs. Useful insights in this regard are reported in [12, 11] . We plan to investigate this issue in our future work.
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Appendix
In this section we report the proof of some technical results.
Proof of Proposition 2.3. Given FSMs
FSMs M 1 ||M 2 and M 2 ||M 1 are isomorphic with bijective function φ : X 1,2 → X 2,1 defined by φ(x 1 , x 2 ) = (x 2 , x 1 ) for any (x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ X 1,2 and by e.g. [2] , ( 1 ) and for the associativity property, we get:
Proof of Proposition 3.1. 
. By definition of the projection operator P Σi (·) we then get [
. Hence, either M 1 or M 2 is not critically observable and a contradiction holds.
Proof of Proposition 3.9. Proof of (i). 
Let R be a bisimulation relation between M 1 and M 2 . Since , w) such that (x 1 , x 2 ), (x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ R which, by (6.1) and condition (iv) in Definition 3.8, implies x 1 ∈ C 1 and x 1 ∈ X 1 \C 1 . Thus, M 1 is not critically observable and a contradiction holds. The proof of (ii) can be given by using a similar reasoning. Proof of Lemma 3.11. The result follows by combining Proposition 2.8 and Lemma 3.10.
